A time when corporate managers sought to expand AholicEs global reach, institutional investors sought to discount their Ahold holdings while expanding their global portfolios. In combination, stock-price market information became more important than ever before. Relatively poor disclosure practices and a lack of transparency in terms of managers’ goals and objectives meant, however, that market agents could not perform their pricing responsibilities in a manner consistent with the needs of the average shareholder whether located in Europe or in the A. Consistent with Goldstein and Kavajecz (2.004), as Ahold became embroiled in crisis over its projected revenue figures, market agents retreated to Amsterdam and the gossip sukanya samriddhi scheme in hindi networks so important, it appears, when making judgements about the integrity or otherwise of corporate management in conditions of uncertainty. Our findings are also consistent with those of Sthlz (1999: 28-9) who noted ‘it is not the case, however, that all effects of globalisation necessar-ily increase the monitoring of management in the short TIM. The reason for this is that globalisation can disrupt existing relationships within a country that led the monitoring of management or large shareholders. Based upon an analysis of the circumstances when Japanese banks relaxed the standards used to assess domestic debt offerings in the face of com-petition from foreign banks, he suggested ‘in the case of Japan, therefore, globalisation in the short run reduced the power of banks, but did not replace that power by the power of the market’.
See, more generally, Stutz (2005) on the limits of globalization. The Ahold case exposed investors to a series of risks that were not well-appreciated in Anglo-American markets and were discounted by Dutch analysts who neither represented the interests of Anglo-American markets nor, perhaps, had the independence of judgement necessary to be critical of popular corporate officials. Cross-listing on the NYSE did not add to market information; quite the contrary, in New York investors followed Amsterdam prices when circumstances began to spin out of control. The Ahold case reminds us that whatever the significance of global-ization in terms of corporate strategy, the nation-state remains impor-tant for setting the terms and conditions of corporate governance, In the European case, where pressures have been brought to bear to discount the power of majority investors, Becht et al. (2003: 114) concluded their survey of European corporate governance and control not ‘limiting the power of large investors can also result in greater managerial discretion and scope for abuse’.
This ‘solution’ is an issue of political economy that would put in play national regimes of accumulation and the relationships between competing claimants for corporate income such that ‘national models’ may be jettisoned in favour of the Anglo-American model. This prospect is viewed with alarm in some quarters (witness Dore 2,000). Finally, the Ahold case could be thought as an instance of what Clark and Hebb (2004) referred to as ‘pension hind corporate engagement’: an instance where major institutional investors intervened directly with the firm to force through reform in the interests of prompting better stock market performance. It seems that domestic and EU regulatory agencies came last to the Ahold crisis; while legal proceedings were instituted to assess the liability of Ahold’s auditors and the like, the swiftest response to the crisis came from those with the biggest ownership stakes in the firm sukanya samriddhi yojana form and sukanya samriddhi scheme calculator.